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21   INTRODUCTION
On 13 and 14 July 1998, a conference on the East Asian crisis was held at the Institute of Development Studies.
This conference brought together top specialists from different regions of the world (with a strong
representation from the most affected countries). There was an interesting combination of experts from
different fields, including international finance, macroeconomic and social policy, as well as development
strategy. Perhaps most interesting was the fact that senior colleagues came from diverse fields, such as the
private sector – especially from financial institutions –and multilateral organisations. This efficiently
complemented the presence of policy-makers from developing countries and from bilateral aid agencies, as well
as academics.
An extremely integrated and broad view of the East Asian crisis and its implications arose from discussions
by this powerful mixture of colleagues; our discussions drew on a series of background papers, available on the
Internet at the address
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/research/easwkshp.html
Amongst the main conclusions were the following:
1. Crises like the East Asian one have major implications for the development prospects of the affected
countries (or 'victim' countries, as several participants called them). If the crisis in East Asia is as prolonged
and deep as many informed observers fear at present, there may be major increases in poverty levels in
those countries, implying a major reversal from previous trends, as those countries had been in the forefront
of poverty reduction. This could imply a threat to the international target of halving the number of poor
people in developing countries by the year 2015.
2. Asian-style currency crises – and their extremely high development costs – raise a very serious concern
about the net development benefits for developing countries of large flows of potentially reversible short-
term international capital. While the high costs of reversals of those flows are evident, the benefits are less
clear. This is in sharp contrast with foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade flows, where the very large
developmental benefits clearly outweigh the costs. As a result, volatile short-term capital flows emerge as a
potential Achilles' heel for the globalised economy and for the market economy in developing countries. If
the international community and national authorities do not learn to manage these flows better, there is a
serious risk that such volatile flows could undermine the tremendous benefits that globalisation and free
markets can otherwise bring.
There was a tremendous sense of urgency, particularly from the East Asian participants, that the
current crisis be contained and reversed, that growth be restarted and that future currency crises be
prevented. It was felt, in particular, that the lessons from the 1994 Mexican peso crisis have not been
learned, even though several proposals have been made to avoid repetition of such a crisis (see, for example,
Griffith-Jones, 1996). As a result, insufficient actions have been taken since 1995 to avoid similarly costly
3currency crises. A strong plea emerged from the conference that the deeper and wider East Asian crisis
should lead to necessary changes, both internationally and nationally, so this would not happen again.
3. There was consensus that surges of short-term flows tend to be pro-cyclical, and not counter-cyclical as
economic theory would suggest, in two crucial respects. Firstly, they tend to flow more towards the more
successful economies or more successful reformers; in the case of East Asia, they went to countries that
already had very high domestic savings rates. Secondly, there tend to be more capital flows at times when
economies are already growing fast; as a consequence, they can accelerate a boom initially, whilst later
greatly contributing to a 'bust'. As regards the first point, one of the most disturbing aspects of the East
Asian crisis was that it occurred in what had been the most successful developing countries for the last three
decades.
4. There were important areas of broad agreement at the conference, on both diagnosis and policy suggestions.
Amongst the latter, there was almost unanimous agreement that the benefits of full capital account
liberalisation were yet to be demonstrated, whilst it was apparent that the associated risks were high. As a
consequence, capital account liberalisation should be careful; prudential measures to discourage excessive
inflows seemed appropriate, provided they were a complement to – and not a substitute for – good
macroeconomic policies and the strengthening of domestic financial systems.
5. There were also important areas where there was either disagreement or – especially – insufficient
knowledge, both on diagnosis and on suggestions for desirable policies. These areas include, for example,
the issues of what causes herding and disaster myopia on the part of international investors, and what
determines overproduction in particular sectors and economies. Further research is urgently required in
these and other areas, so as to provide a better knowledge base for policy suggestions.
In Section 2, we explore what caused the East Asian crisis, and why it has been so deep and extensive. Section 3
analyses the economic and social costs of the East Asian crises. Section 4 evaluates policy implications, at both
the national and international levels. Section 5 examines the areas where research is most urgently needed to
underpin better policies, both for prevention of crises and for better crisis management.
2   CAUSES OF THE CRISIS
2.1   Why Did the Crisis Happen in East Asia?
2.1.1   Domestic factors
As underlined by Reisen (1998) in the case of the Asian and other currency crises, domestic causes generally
have their roots in the large capital inflows that those countries experienced. Indeed, so-called domestic causes,
such as overvalued real exchange rates and rapidly growing asset prices, were to an in important extent
endogenous effects of massive net capital inflows. It is extremely difficult to separate domestic from
international factors.
4Weakness of  the f inancial  system
The 67th Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS 1997) published on 9 July 1997 already
stressed the financial fragility of Asian countries, and especially of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Thailand: during the 1990s, those countries experienced a more rapid expansion of credit than any industrial
country. According to the BIS, the banking fragilities in Asia can be explained by several factors: violent asset
price cycles driven by an excessive expansion of bank credit, the loss of degrees of freedom for monetary policy
as a result of capital account liberalisation, and the level of bad debts inherited from directed lending policies.
Although financial reforms were introduced during the 1980s and the 1990s, enforcement of regulation of
the financial sector did not keep pace, resulting in a significant proportion of credit being allocated to
unproductive or speculative investment. It was emphasised at the conference that even in developed countries
(e.g. the Scandinavian countries) liberalisation of the domestic financial sector is typically not accompanied by
sufficient improvements in financial sector supervision, and, especially, by appropriate enforcement of such
supervision. Indeed, Kaminski and Reinhart (1996) find that for the period 1970–95 financial liberalisation,
followed by a private lending boom, plays a significant role in explaining the probability of a banking crisis; in
turn, they find that banking crises help predict currency crises. In the East Asian case, lending was increasingly
channelled towards property and non-traded activities. Ranis and Stewart (1998) stressed that 20 to 25 per cent
of commercial bank debt was allocated to real estate in Indonesia and between 15 and 20 per cent in the
Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand.
In the East Asian case, lending was increasingly channelled towards property and non-traded activities.
Ranis and Stewart (1998) stressed that 20 to 25 per cent of commercial bank debt was allocated to real estate in
Indonesia and between 15 and 20 per cent in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook (1997) also cites inadequacies in the
regulation and supervision of financial institutions as a major source of the financial system's weaknesses. The
IMF adds:
…  limited experience among financial institutions in the pricing and managing of risk, lack of commercial
orientation, poor corporate governance, and lax internal controls, all in the face of movements toward
liberalisation and increased competitive pressure, had contributed to imprudent lending including lending
associated with relationship banking and corrupt practices.
Though agreeing with this diagnosis, the conference rejected broader 'banana republic stories,' that is, an
emphasis on 'crony capitalism', as an important explanation of the East Asian crisis. Indeed, it was agreed that
problems in particular countries should not simplistically be defined as causes of crises.
Inadequate banking supervision together with poor assessments of financial risks largely contributed to the
sharp increase of credit towards unproductive investments. Credit was combined with the prevalence of large
unhedged foreign-currency-denominated corporate and bank debt. An important lesson should have been
learned from countries like the United Kingdom, where prudential limits were placed on foreign currency
exposure by banks when capital flows were liberalised. More broadly, it would seem desirable that in general in
developing countries bank lending in foreign currency to companies that sell to the domestic market should be
carefully restricted. After massive devaluations, this lending contributed in East Asia (as previously in Mexico) to
5very high levels of non-performing loans. These high levels of bad loans combined with low capital-to-asset
ratios brought most of the banks into unsustainable situations (Reisen 1998).
Overproduction
The Asian crisis is a crisis not of overconsumption, as was the case in Mexico in 1994, but of overproduction.
As underlined above, the boom in bank loans was mainly channelled towards investment rather than
consumption. This overinvestment (reaching in the case of South Korea and Thailand levels higher than 35 per
cent of GDP during several consecutive years) led logically to overproduction. Average fixed investment rates
are reported in Figure 1.
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A number of external factors seem to have contributed to overproduction. Among others, the depreciation of
the yen against the dollar, which started in mid-1995, coupled with the Chinese devaluation in 1994, hit the
competitiveness of East Asian countries; this occurred largely because the East Asian currencies were effectively
pegged to the US dollar. The decline in competitiveness was reinforced by upward pressures on real exchange
rates due to large capital inflows. Decreasing exports led to overcapacity which is particularly dramatic today in
the car, electronics (semi-conductors) and textile industries. The recession in Japan also contributed to the
region's economic problems as it reduced that country's demand for imports.
Park and Song (1998) stress that it was foreign capital that led to the investment boom. Looking at the
correlation between capital-inflow-to-GDP and current-account-deficit-to-GDP ratios, the authors show that
the liberalisation of the domestic financial sector combined with the opening up of the capital account increased
the availability of foreign capital and thus largely contributed to the financing of new projects:  'capital inflow
6was driving domestic investment, not the other way around' (Park and Song 1998). This leads us to the factors
that relate to the international environment and which certainly played the greatest role in triggering the crisis.
2.1.2   External factors
External capital  f lows
The five Asian crisis countries received extremely high levels of private external finance between 1994 and 1996.
In 1997, there was a dramatic reversal of capital flows. According to figures from the Institute of International
Finance (IIF 1998), the five East Asian countries hardest hit by the crisis (South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand and the Philippines) experienced a turnaround of US$105 billion in a single year, a shift from an inflow
of US$93 billion in 1996 to an estimated outflow of US$12 billion in 1997, an outflow projected to continue in
1998. Most of this swing occurred in commercial bank lending, followed by short-term portfolio flows, whilst
foreign direct investment remained constant. The turnaround of US$105 billion in the five Asian economies
represents more than 10 per cent of their combined GDP; this shift thus is larger than the 8 per cent shift that
occurred in Latin America in the early 1980s as the debt crisis exploded.
Portfolio flows turned out to be negative in East Asia in 1997 with an outflow of more than US $10 billion,
whilst in 1996 more than US $10 billion had flowed in (IIF 1998). International bank credit reached the highest
levels among private flows, with about US $50 billion both in 1995 and 1996. This upsurge in international bank
loans was dramatically reversed in 1997 with an estimated outflow of US $20 billion. Not only had the scale of
lending grown rapidly, but its maturity was also very short, making these countries more vulnerable to a loss of
confidence. About 70 per cent of total international bank claims on South Korea and Thailand had a maturity
shorter than a year. In mid-1997, Indonesia and Malaysia had about 60 per cent of their claims maturing in less
than a year's time. These levels were far above other emerging economies and about ten percentage points
higher than the average share for Latin America (BIS 1998). Even more seriously, at the onset of the crisis, the
ratio of short-term debt to international reserves ranged from 0.6 for Malaysia to 2.1 for South Korea. This
implied a high dependence of those countries on the willingness of foreign creditors to roll over existing short-
term credit. This is very similar to the high level of Mexican, dollar-denominated treasury bills (Tesobonos)
which triggered the crisis in late 1994 as their level was higher than Mexican foreign exchange reserves; one
difference was that in the Asian case, the debt was private.
The highly volatile flows into the East Asian Crisis countries were mostly intermediated through the
banking system: Corsetti et al. (1998) compute ratios of intermediation that show that, on average, more than 70
per cent of the external borrowings of the five Asian countries were intermediated through the banking system
except for Indonesia where only 40 per cent were intermediated. As Howell (1998) puts it, Asian banking
systems and capital markets acted as trampolines rather than shock absorbers, quickly leveraging foreign
currency inflows, and later outflows.
The steep increase in short-term foreign borrowing has several causes. The BIS (1996) argues that an
increasing differential between local and foreign interest rates driven by tighter domestic monetary policies
encouraged foreign borrowing. Reisen (1998) stresses, however, that, in part, interest rate differentials in East
Asia may have been due to structural deficiencies in the financial sector. As a consequence, liberalising the
7capital account before these structural deficiencies were removed may have been inappropriate. Indeed, the
liberalisation of domestic financial systems and the opening up of capital accounts attracted high levels of short-
term, potentially reversible loans. The narrowness of local equity and bond markets also added further pressure
to borrow from abroad.
Changes in perceptions by international investors and lenders
What seems most disturbing about the Asian crisis is that it happened to countries that had been so successful
for a long period, not just in terms of economic growth but also in terms of great dynamism in their exports,
low rates of inflation, high rates of savings and a rather equitable income distribution. Even though several of
these countries had high current account deficits in their balance of payments, this had been seen as acceptable
for quite a long time by both analysts and markets alike, for two reasons: firstly, these deficits were financing
very high investment rates; secondly, as mentioned above, the current account deficits did not originate in fiscal
deficits – on the contrary, the Asian economies had fiscal surpluses – but were caused by private sector deficits.
Clearly there were problems in the Asian economies. But these problems did not change abruptly and
cannot explain the scale of the crisis and especially its timing (Griffith-Jones 1998a; Reisen 1998). There is
another causal factor, which relates more to the international dimension, and in particular to the behaviour of
international capital flows and to perceptions of investors which can deteriorate very rapidly. This aspect is
linked to certain imperfections of international capital markets that have almost always featured in the financial
panics of earlier times, but whose impact has increased significantly due to the speed with which markets can
react in today's global economy (Griffith-Jones 1998a). Paradoxically, this impact appears to be strongest for
economies that either are or are perceived to be in the process of becoming highly successful. In these
situations, euphoria in international capital markets and in rating agencies interacts perversely with complacency
on the part of governments in recipient countries.
Successful economies offer high returns by way of yields as well as capital gains. If international investors
can find ways to enter these economies, or if their entrance is facilitated by capital account liberalisation, they
tend to rush in, generating a surge of capital inflows that affects key economic variables. Exchange rates become
overvalued; the prices of key assets – like shares or real estate – rise quickly and sharply. There is an increase
both in real income and in perceived wealth. Banks tend to relax lending standards, lifting liquidity constraints
on businesses, as they assume that current trends will continue. The balance of payments deteriorates, often
quite rapidly, as both consumption and investment rise. Initially, this is not seen as a problem, as foreign lenders
and investors are willing to continue lending or investing. Economic authorities delay the necessary adjustment,
confident that their previous success will be continued, and that crises happen elsewhere. This latter problem
was particularly serious in East Asian countries, as these countries had a long history of growth and no recent
experience of balance of payments crises.
Then, something changes. The change may be domestic or international, economic or political, important
or relatively small. This change triggers a sharp modification in perceptions, leading to a large fall in
confidence in the economy among internationally mobile investors, that is both foreign investors and
nationals able to take their liquid assets out. The change of perception tends to be both large and quick. A
country that was perceived as a successful economy or a successful reformer – for which no amount of praise
8was sufficient – suddenly is seen as fragile, risky and crisis-prone. The change of perception tends to be far larger
than the magnitude of underlying change in fundamentals warrants. Furthermore, any weakness in economic
fundamentals is then discovered and magnified by markets. As in East Asia, there can be much overshooting.
Exchange rates collapse, stock markets and property prices also fall sharply.
This pattern helps explain the currency and banking crises in the Southern Cone of Latin America in the
early 1980s and the Mexican peso crisis. It also provides important elements for understanding the 1997 East
Asian crisis. There are significant differences between these crises and previous ones throughout the centuries,
and amongst East Asian economies. But the boom–bust behaviour of short-term lenders and investors, driven
not just by real trends but by dramatic changes in perceptions, is a common denominator to these crises. So is
the complacency of the economic authorities in recipient countries during the period of boom. The damage that
can be done by sharp changes in capital flows is far greater when, as in East Asia, a high proportion of the
inflows are short-term and easily reversible.
In East Asia, clearly the largest reversal of flows occurred in bank flows, apparently disproportionately by
smaller banks, which seem less informed and more prone to herd behaviour. Park and Song (1998) also analyse
the role played by mutual Asian country funds based in New York in the deepening of the crisis. Following the
same methodology as Frankel and Schmukler (1996), they find that the crisis spread from Thailand to three
Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and that the funds did play a role as a
transmission channel. Indeed, according to the authors, following the Thai shock, funds from other countries in
Asia may have liquidated part of their holdings fearing potential redemptions. The crisis spread from Thailand to
other Southeast Asian countries through mutual fund prices first and then impacted on local stock prices. This is
a very important result as it confirms, to some extent, that institutional investors played a role in spreading the
crisis to other Asian countries.
On the other hand, Howell (1998) has argued that the narrowness of local capital markets did not allow for
large liquidations and thus did not permit foreign institutional investors to liquidate large amounts of their
holdings. Howell argues that hedge funds could have played an important role in the foreign exchange markets.
Hedge funds are unregulated financial institutions which use one or more alternative investment strategies,
including hedging against market downturns and utilising return-enhancing tools such as leverage, derivatives
and arbitrage. Estimates of the size of this fast-growing industry vary but are usually around US$200 billion of
assets. Although this represents a relatively small share of total institutional investors' assets, hedge funds rely
heavily on leverage which could make them control about US$1 trillion of assets.
A number of recent studies have tried to evaluate the impact of those investors on the Asian crisis.
Eichengreen and Mathieson (1998) find little evidence that hedge funds led the crisis. They nonetheless propose
a set of policies such as better reporting systems or possible restrictions on domestic currency loans to hedge
funds to prevent large short positions against local currencies. Howell (op.cit.) confirms that the absence of data
on a number of hedge funds transactions, such as OTC derivative contracts written by major investment banks,
clearly leads one to underestimate their speculative role against currencies.
In the light of these recent studies and of discussions at the IDS conference, it seems firstly that
institutional investors played a role, if not in triggering the crisis, then in its deepening and spreading within Asia
and, secondly, that there is a need to distinguish between types of investors. For example mutual funds impacted
9on Asian stock exchanges whereas hedge funds played a more important role in currency markets. It is clearly
important to carry out further research on herding behaviour among institutional investors in the time of a crisis,
as well on other aspects of institutional investment (see Section 5).
2.2   Why Was the Crisis in East Asia So Deep?
What was unexpected about the East Asian crisis was not just that it happened, but that it was so deep and
prolonged, and that there was so much contagion within the region. This relates to inappropriate management
of the crisis – both by the countries themselves and by the IMF – as well as to exogenous factors, such as slow
growth in Japan, which then turned into recession. Furthermore, close trade links between the East Asian
countries, which were a source of strength when rapid growth characterised the region, became a source of
weakness as recession weakened demand for intra-regional imports.
As regards inappropriate management of the crisis, East Asian countries seem to have had less experience
in these matters than some other regions, as – unlike Latin America, for example – they had not faced balance of
payment crises for a long time. This may have contributed to some initial delays in recognising the depth of the
crisis and the need to act quickly, as well as to the mistakes in crisis management. Indeed, maybe interesting
lessons for Asia on crisis management and resolution can now be drawn from Latin America.
However both the East Asian countries and especially the IMF faced a new and difficult challenge. Capital-
account-led crises, which relate to expectations of private investors and lenders, may need different responses to
traditional balance of payments crises, provoked by problems on the current account, and caused by public
sector deficits. In the new capital-account-led crises, the key challenge is to restore the confidence of private
actors. Several conference participants argued that IMF programmes, with their stringent macroeconomic
conditions and overambitious requisites for rapid and deep structural reforms, had not been particularly effective
in restoring confidence. Indeed, an asymmetry in the assessment of IMF evaluations by the markets was noted.
Whilst negative information on countries from the IMF got attention and further undermined confidence,
positive assessments had far less effect in restoring confidence. This seemed particularly clear in South Korea,
which had carefully followed an IMF programme, including the restructuring of banks. However, due to the
seriousness of the recession, and other factors, confidence has not been restored, as evidenced by very high
premium costs of international borrowing and – even – difficulties in restoring trade credits; this, in turn, makes
not only increasing exports but also economic recovery and restructuring more difficult (see Park and Song
1998).
Another vicious circle that has emerged in East Asia is that recession leads to increased unemployment and
poverty (see Section 3), which undermines political stability, which in turn erodes confidence further.
Restoration of growth, as well as a more democratic and participatory society, were seen as crucial elements for
private sector confidence rebuilding.
3   THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE EAST ASIAN CRISIS
The East Asian 'tiger economies' which, prior to the current crisis, were seen as models for economic
development, were not only successful in terms of per capita income growth in average terms but also achieved
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substantial poverty reduction. Ranis and Stewart (1998) report a strong decrease in the proportion of the
population classified as poor on the basis of their private income: in Indonesia this proportion fell from around
57 per cent in 1970 to 15 per cent by 1990; the corresponding numbers for Malaysia are 50 per cent and 15 per
cent respectively. In South Korea 4 per cent of the population were classified as poor in 1984 while in Thailand
the proportion fell from 39 per cent at the end of the 1960s to 13 per cent in 1992 (for all these data see Ranis
and Stewart 1998, p 9).
Improved access to social services was relatively less important, although some successes could be
observed in this field also: access to public health and education improved throughout the region. In spite of the
fact that overall levels of government spending were low, social allocation ratios – the proportion of government
expenditure dedicated to social issues – were relatively high. The sum of education and health expenditure as a
percentage of government spending in selected East Asian countries was high and amounted on average to 16.7
per cent during the period 1990–1995 (Ranis and Stewart 1998).
The basis of this success in poverty reduction was a sustained period of high and reasonably equitable
private income growth rather than government efforts at improved social service provision. The outward-
oriented growth strategy of these economies focused on rapidly growing labour-intensive exports. It was
through these sectors and their absorption of labour that widespread increases in private income were realised
and poverty reduction was mainly achieved. Up to the first half of the 1990s most of the region's countries
experienced high national income growth at annual rates of around 8 per cent. However, as we now know, this
was not to last.
3.1   Limping Tigers
The history of high growth was reversed by the financial crisis of 1997 and gave way to a recession which today
(July 1998) is still continuing. This is the most obvious cost of the crisis, taking the form of forgone or even
negative growth. GDP contractions are expected for a number of Asian economies in 1998. The Thai economy
is expected to shrink by at least 8 per cent after being stagnant at 0.5 per cent in 1997 and after having grown at
around 8 per cent during the first half of the 1990s. Korean GDP is expected to fall 4 per cent from 5.5 per cent
in 1997, Indonesia is forecast to contract by 12 per cent in the fiscal year 1998/99 after maintaining growth at
4.7 per cent in 1997. In Malaysia, GDP growth is expected to fall from 8 per cent in 1997 to between -4 per cent
and -5 per cent during 1998. In other cases, growth rates have stayed positive but slowed dramatically between
1997 and 1998: from 7.8 per cent to between 0.5 per cent and 1.5 per cent in Singapore, and from 5.1 per cent
to 2.8 per cent in the Philippines.1
The effect of the crisis on Indonesia has been particularly severe. The situation of Indonesia is complicated
in so far as the country is simultaneously suffering the effects of the financial crisis, of political instability and of
adverse climatic conditions. Before the crisis, Indonesia had been one of the most successful East Asian newly
industrialised countries (NICs) (World Bank 1998). Following the dramatic reduction in the proportion of the
population classified as poor, to around 15 per cent in 1990, it is now expected that 'about half of the country's
200 million people will be unable to afford food and basic needs'.2 The poverty line is defined by a per capita
income of around one dollar a day (World Bank 1998), a threshold value which – in so far as it is denominated
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in US dollars – is directly affected by devaluation. Such a focus is adequate as prices of basic necessities have
been affected by exchange rate changes (Reuters 1998c): a devaluation can sharply lower domestic real income in
a developing country by increasing the price of imported commodities. All this is exacerbated by the effects of
this year's strong El Niño current. Indonesia is one of the worst-affected countries and suffered food shortages
as a consequence of extensive droughts as well as widespread forest fires (FAO 1997).
In general, the crisis can be expected to affect the region's economies through several channels: it has been
mentioned above that one immediate effect of a devaluation on an export-oriented corporate sector will be an
increase in international competitiveness. In a regionally contagious crisis – as in the Asian case (cf. Park and
Song 1998) – this can lead, and has led, to competitive devaluations as each of the affected countries attempts to
restore export competitiveness (cf. Corestti et al. 1998).
Devaluations affect part of the domestic manufacturing sector in a more direct manner: they increase the
domestic currency value of the foreign-denominated debt burden (see Corsetti et al. for the case of Korean
chaebol; also Wade 1998). This is particularly damaging in the case of short-term debt which has to be repaid
before the exchange rate can recover. Yet even in the case of longer-term obligations, a devaluation increases the
domestic currency value of debt servicing costs. This problem is further exacerbated if interest rates have to be
raised in order to stabilise the value of the currency, since such a move also increases the debt-servicing cost of
loans denominated in domestic currency3. Furthermore, exchange rate devaluations can have adverse effects on
domestic firms as prices of imported inputs increase. This can lead to dismissals of workers and, in cases of
serious deterioration, to bankruptcies.
The increased profitability of exports in domestic currency terms would in principle provide an incentive to
increase exports, yet this is subject to two further problems: on the one hand, a simultaneous increase in exports
by the region's economies could depress world market prices if those exports are concentrated in the same
sector. On the other hand the ability of emerging economies to increase exports is closely linked to the
availability of trade credit. In the East Asian case, this credit has not been available after the crisis, and the 'wave
of cheap exports' to the developed economies is yet to arrive (cf. Wade 1998; Park and Song 1998). There is a
more fundamental problem: trade credit may facilitate exports to developed-country markets but the major part
of trade prior to the crisis took place within the region. With falling demand in East Asian economies including
Japan, export markets are unable to compensate for deflationary pressure on domestic markets (cf. Howell
1998).
3.2   Haunting Asia – the Vagaries of the Spectre of Poverty
Given that poverty reduction in Asia was mainly based on high growth and given that it is in this area that the
financial crisis has its most devastating effects it should come as no surprise that the most significant impact on
poverty levels takes the form of reductions in private income. The prime channels through which this effect
takes place are rising unemployment and falling wages.
Unemployment in the region has increased dramatically since the onset of the crisis and is set to continue
increasing in the future. In Thailand, unemployment had increased from an annual average rate of 1.54 per cent
in 1996 to 5.6 per cent by 1998 (ILO 1998). The situation has continued to deteriorate, with around 2,000 job
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losses occurring daily since the beginning of July 1998 (Reuters 1998d). In South Korea, unemployment has
risen from 2.3 per cent to 7 per cent, the highest unemployment rate on record (Reuters 1998e). The immediate
effect of this has been a dramatic fall in the income of the affected workers since unemployment provision is
almost universally absent (with the partial exceptions of South Korea and Japan). Other negative effects of this
rise in unemployment have been underlined at the conference: employees in the formal urban sector often
contributed to the maintenance of dependent family members who now suffer reductions in transfer incomes as
these contributions are no longer available (Robb 1998). Furthermore, rising unemployment may depress the
wages of those who remain in employment.
Another labour market phenomenon has been increased informal-sector participation which certainly
depressed earnings in this sector. This has occurred in the urban informal sector as well as in rural areas (Robb
1998). In urban areas, however, there have been further repercussions on those sub-sectors of the informal
sector that are closely linked to formal-sector activities and therefore suffer more directly from the crisis (Ranis
and Stewart 1998). Increased informal-sector participation is closely linked to rising female participation which
can take the form of prostitution. It has also led to an increase in child labour with the corresponding adverse
effects on education (Robb 1998). An increase in prostitution in general as well as an increase in child
prostitution in consequence of rising poverty and unemployment is reported from Indonesia (Reuters 1998f).
Other factors impacting on living standards have been price and interest rate rises. Food price rises in the
wake of the crisis have depressed real wages (Robb 1998). This further exacerbates the impact on those who
already suffer income losses as a consequence of the crisis, all the more so as poor households tend to spend a
higher proportion of their income on food. Price rises of imported goods as a consequence of devaluation are a
major problem. Health service access has worsened as the price of imported medical drugs has increased.
Interest rate rises have been damaging not only to local businesses but also to households, who increasingly find
it necessary to access informal lenders. Credit is available on local, informal markets on expensive terms, and
there are reports of loan sharks increasingly resorting to violence to recover loans (Robb 1998).
Households' coping strategies have incorporated attempts at expenditure reduction. The burden of reduced
consumption tends to be unequally distributed within households: women and children are likely to suffer
disproportionately (Robb 1998). There may be further problems in the case of budget cuts. Reduced health and
education spending can be expected to lead to quantitative reductions in human capital formation or to lower
quality of human capital. Reduced health care expenditure – in particular against the background of a higher
incidence of prostitution – can lead to an increase in HIV infections.
In Southeast Asia – perhaps more so than in other regions – welfare issues are closely linked to the
performance of the external sector. Financial turmoil thus has to be seen as more than a mere nuisance
depressing corporate profits and upsetting balance of payments statistics. High private sector growth and
successful export performance have been at the heart of successes in poverty reduction and human development
achievements in Southeast Asia. It is in this area that the crisis is showing some of its most dramatic effects. It is
evident, therefore, that global financial instability can exacerbate poverty in Asia in a number of ways, both
during the current crisis and in the future, through adverse effects on productive capacity and on the quality of
the human capital stock.
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3.3   The Policy Fallout
If macroeconomic policy measures are to lead to social improvements, it is important that they are designed to
avoid further recessionary impacts. This makes it necessary to reconsider the kind of austerity prescription that
has traditionally been implemented in Latin American crisis scenarios. The IMF has recently begun to make
some concessions in this direction after insisting initially on contractionary and high-interest-rate policies
(Reuters 1998e). (The issue of interest rate measures in currency crises is further explored in Section 4.)
A number of concerns should be borne in mind considering immediate, short-term policy measures. It has
been pointed out by Ranis and Stewart (1998) that macroeconomic measures should aim to restrict unnecessary
expenditure and that social allocation ratios should at least be stabilised. They also propose a series of relief
measures on a microeconomic level. In the long run they suggest that the main concern should be with
establishing universally accessible social security systems. There are doubts, though, as to how far the
implementation of social security systems will be affordable in the foreseeable future.
Useful as all these proposals may be, in the long run there is a more fundamental concern for the region.
Social security systems may help to spread the cost of the crisis over the whole of society – and this can make an
important difference to those worst affected. Yet the primary concern should be how to avoid crises of this kind
from occurring in the first place. In small, open and highly trade-focused economies like those of East Asia, any
involvement in international financial turmoil is highly disruptive for the countries' external economic relations
in general. This can be expected to have a highly recessionary impact which in turn threatens achievements in
poverty reduction.
The central lesson of the East Asian crisis therefore is: financial stability matters! A chain can only be as
strong as its weakest link and the weak link in the East Asian development process has been unstable external
finance. If economic growth is to pull the region out of poverty once more, the link needs to be strengthened
and stabilised. This is an essential precondition for sustained and equitable economic growth and therefore for
lasting poverty elimination.
4   POLICY IMPLICATIONS, FOR BOTH CRISIS PREVENTION AND CRISIS
MANAGEMENT
Within present arrangements, there is growing concern that the volatility and reversibility of some categories of
capital flows, as dramatically illustrated by the East Asian crisis, and their very negative effects imply that the
costs of these flows to countries' development may be higher than their benefits, at least during certain periods.
As a consequence, there was broad consensus at the IDS conference that important changes need to be made in
the international monetary system as a whole and in recipient country policies to avoid costly crises, as well as to
manage them better if they do occur. This will help to limit the negative effects of financial globalisation on
emerging economies. Care must be taken, however, that the measures adopted contribute to broaden access of
all developing countries to capital flows, particularly long-term ones. In this context, foreign direct investment is
especially beneficial, as it contributes not only a more stable source of capital flows, but also technological and
managerial know-how as well as better access to markets.
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It seems urgent to do the following: (a) identify the possible changes required to achieve these aims, (b)
evaluate carefully the potential economic effects of such changes, and (c) adopt the required measures, including
possible institutional developments where gaps exist for implementing such measures.
Two broad areas of action need to be focused on, in relation to currency crises: crisis prevention (discussed
in Section 4.1) and better crisis management (discussed in Section 4.2). In both areas, changes are required,
nationally and internationally. National and international aspects involve public and private actors (Table 1
provides a matrix of the categories of actions required, the actors that need to be involved and examples of
essential actions that need to be adopted).
4.1   Crisis Prevention
4.1.1   Domestic measures in capital-receiving countries
Capital  account l iberal isat ion and strengthening of  the domestic f inancial  sector
At the conference there was consensus that capital account liberalisation should be done in a very careful and
gradual way. A problem is that capital account liberalisation tends to be driven not just by considerations of
efficiency, but also by vested interests, both international and domestic. Some participants stressed the
particularly strong emphasis on capital account liberalisation emerging from the US Treasury. Others stressed
that financial interests in the Asian countries, keen for large profits, had also played an important role in pushing
for capital liberalisation. However, it would be crucial to define a path of capital account liberalisation, based on
developmental efficiency, and not on pressures from interest groups.
Furthermore, capital account liberalisation should be accompanied by appropriate prudential regulation,
especially that related to the financial sector. In the UK case, when capital account liberalisation was
implemented, foreign currency exposure by British banks was restricted. Similar rules need to be applied or
strengthened in developing countries. Careful limits also need to be placed on foreign currency borrowing by
corporate entities, especially from local banks: even though banks can have matched foreign exchange assets and
liabilities, apparently protecting them from devaluation, they will not be protected from credit risk if their
corporate borrowers sell to the domestic market but have foreign-exchange-denominated debt; they could
become insolvent in the face of a large devaluation. This indirect exchange rate risk for banks, needs to be
limited and properly assessed, for prudential purposes.
The Asian crisis proved again that capital account liberalisation can only work well if appropriate prudential
supervision and regulation of the domestic financial system are in place, tasks which are very difficult,
particularly but not only in developing countries (as illustrated by the Scandinavian banking crises). The
importance for the good functioning of domestic financial, and especially banking markets, of certain basic pre-
conditions was stressed at the conference. These preconditions include well-established bankruptcy procedures,
clear accountancy rules consistent with international standards, protection of minority shareholders and others.
Conference participants agreed that such minimum standards do not imply that all developing countries should
have identical financial systems, in the same way that the requisite of good plumbing does not require all people
to having similar houses.
Table 1
Actors Capital-receiving Countries Capital-supplying Countries IFIs
Types of Measures Authorities Markets Authorities Markets IMF BIS IBRD




































































As regards capital account liberalisation itself, the standard recommendation that long-term capital flows
need to be liberalised first and short-term flows should be liberalised last is confirmed by events in East Asia.
Indeed, capital account liberalisation and incentives in some East Asian countries had particularly encouraged
short-term capital inflows. An example was the establishment of the Bangkok International Banking Facility
(BIBF), which was widely seen to have greatly eased access to foreign financing and especially encouraged – by
tax and other measures – short-term inflows. Such explicit incentives to short-term flows should clearly not be
used in the future. There was some disagreement at the conference about whether, in the case of South Korea,
the sharp increase in short-term flows was mainly due to inappropriate sequencing of liberalisation (biased
towards short-term flows) or whether there was a high proportion of short-term flows because it became more
difficult and expensive to borrow internationally long-term. The importance of developing long-term
instruments, e.g. the long-term domestic bond market, was highlighted. Pension fund reform may help increase
the domestic supply of long-term capital.
An interesting distinction was made between the opening up of foreign financial services, broadly seen as
very positive because foreign firms improve efficiency in the financial industry, and opening up of the capital
account, which can be more problematic. However, some doubts were expressed about whether this analytically
sharp distinction was so relevant practically, that is, if the establishment of foreign firms in the financial sector
did not facilitate foreign capital flows.
To summarise, long-term inflows should be liberalised before short-term inflows. Outflows should be
liberalised after inflows have been liberalised. However, restrictions on outflows should not be reimposed during
crises, since this is clearly counter-productive, as was again demonstrated in the Asian crises.
There is a strong case for market-based 'Chilean-style' measures (such as non-remunerated reserve
requirements on flows of up to one year), to discourage excessive surges of short-term, potentially reversible
inflows and to improve the maturity structure of external debt. This could help reduce the likelihood of currency
crises. However, further study is required to establish a taxonomy of measures taken in different countries, both
developing (e.g. Chile, Colombia, Malaysia) and developed (e.g. Spain and Germany) and to evaluate their costs
and benefits (see Section 5). Furthermore, it is important that such measures should not be seen as a panacea,
but that they should be part of a package of policy measures that include sound and counter-cyclical
macroeconomic fundamentals as well as a strong and well-regulated domestic financial system.
Indeed, it is in periods of excessive surges of capital inflows that recipient countries have greater degrees of
freedom for policy-making. Here, counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies play an essential role in reducing
excessive growth of domestic absorption, and/or current account deficits. It is important that economic
authorities 'lean against the wind' with their macroeconomic policies in periods of large surges of capital inflows
and/or domestic credit booms. The recent experience and literature indicate that a tightening of macroeconomic
policies is particularly desirable when indicators of vulnerability to currency crisis start to deteriorate quickly or
pass certain thresholds. This includes cases where current account deficits start to grow rapidly – and certainly if
they exceed 4 per cent of GDP – where the proportion of easily reversible capital flows to total flows is high and
rising and, particularly, where short-term external liabilities grow rapidly and start approaching the same level as
or even exceed foreign exchange reserves. Thus, high levels of foreign exchange reserves and limits on the level
of short-term external liabilities are crucial for currency crisis avoidance. Low current account deficits also help
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reduce the likelihood of crises, though it needs to be mentioned that, in 1997, South Korea had a fairly low and
decreasing current account deficit and still had a major currency crisis.
An appropriate exchange rate regime is also essential for relatively small, open economies, so as to make
them less vulnerable to currency attacks. This is a complex issue, and the choice of exchange rate regime should
be linked to the country's specific circumstances. A freely floating exchange rate acts as an automatic stabiliser
for capital flows, but can cause competitiveness problems. Fixed exchange rates offer apparently secure yields to
very short-term investors, and can encourage domestic corporations to borrow abroad. Furthermore, fixed
exchange rates can – when the situation deteriorates – offer fixed goalposts for hedge funds and others to attack.
International evidence seems to show that exchange rate regimes using wide bands – with a possible crawling
peg element – offer a good combination of flexibility with some desirable guidance to the market and an anchor
for monetary policy. However, further research is required on exchange rate regimes in open economies (see
Section 5) when the situation deteriorates.
A counter-cyclical approach should also be applied to the supervision and regulation of the financial
system, and particularly the banking system. In boom times, supervision and regulation of banks – as well as
credit decisions by banks themselves – should not be based solely on expectations of a continued growth
scenario among borrowers. Good economic periods are bad times to evaluate creditworthiness; as a
consequence, stress-testing for bank loans is essential. Indeed, potential downside risks, including the possibility
of capital flows slowing down or being reversed – and the economic slowdowns – need to be considered both in
credit decisions and in supervisory evaluations of loans, as well as the assessment of collaterals, (such as
property) whose value is linked to the business cycle. Such a counter-cyclical approach would moderate booms
of domestic bank lending which often exacerbate the impact of excessive surges of capital inflows. High liquidity
and capital requirements for banks can also provide a valuable additional cushion for downside risks.
4.1.2   International measures
The current international discussion – in forums like the G-7, the IMF and the G-22 – has stressed improved
information and surveillance of developing countries as an important mechanism to make future crises less
likely. Not enough emphasis is being placed on international capital market surveillance, which would also be
very useful. Furthermore, at the conference there was a general feeling that whilst improved information on
countries is extremely valuable, it is clearly insufficient. As discussed above, often the key problem is not lack of
information (important as that may be), but how available information is analysed. Indeed, the description of a
glass as half-empty or half-full does not mainly depend on whether the glass is clean, but on the mood of the
viewer; similarly, with markets' perceptions of emerging economies. Therefore, additional tools to improve
information are required, including better and more complete regulation of international capital flows.
The main responsibility for discouraging excessive reversible inflows – as well as managing them – falls on
the recipient countries. However, the large scale of international funds – compared to the small size of
developing country markets – leads us to question whether measures by recipient countries to discourage
excessive short-term capital inflows are enough to deal with capital surges and the risk of their reversal. Three
strong reasons make complementary action by source countries and international bodies necessary. Firstly, not
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all major recipient countries will be willing to discourage short-term capital inflows, and some may even
encourage them. Thus the tax and regulatory measures taken to encourage the Bangkok International Banking
Facility, encouraged short-term borrowing. Secondly, even those recipient countries that have deployed a battery
of measures to discourage short-term capital inflows have on occasions found these measures insufficient to
stem very massive inflows. Thirdly, if major emerging countries experience attacks on their currencies that also
result in difficulties servicing their debt, they will be forced to seek large official funding. There is a clear need
for international and/or source country regulation that will discourage excessive reversible capital inflows. If this
is not developed, international private investors and creditors might continue to assume excessive risks, in the
knowledge that they will be bailed out if the situation becomes critical. This is the classical moral hazard problem
(see Section 4.2.2).
There is a growing consensus on the need to complete and improve international prudential supervision
and regulation, to adapt it to the new scale and nature of private flows. Indeed, the conference noted that there
is at present a large asymmetry in regulation, as domestic financial markets are highly regulated, whereas there is
limited international regulation of financial markets (FitzGerald 1998). There are two categories of flows to
emerging markets where additional international and/or source country regulation and supervision may be
particularly necessary, as these flows seem insufficiently regulated and their surges, as well as outflows, have
played a particularly prominent role in sparking off recent currency crises; the latter would seem to occur
particularly because they are reversible. The first of these is short-term bank loans (particularly important in the
Asian crisis); the other is easily reversible portfolio flows (especially important in the Mexican peso crisis).
International bank loans (including short-term loans) are already regulated by industrial countries' central
banks; these national regulations are coordinated by the Basle Committee. However, existing regulations were
not enough to discourage excessive short-term bank lending to several of the East Asian countries. A key reason
was that until just before the crisis most of these East Asian countries (and particularly countries like South
Korea) were seen by everybody including regulators as creditworthy. Another important reason seems to have
been current regulatory practice, as agreed by the Basle Committee. For example, for non-OECD countries
loans of residual maturity of up to one year have a weighting of only 20 per cent for capital adequacy purposes,
whilst loans over one year have a weighting of 100  per cent for capital adequacy purposes. As a result of this
rule, short-term lending is more profitable for international banks. Thus a regulatory bias that encourages short-
term lending is added to banks' economic preference for lending short-term, especially in situations of perceived
high risk. The issue needs to be rapidly examined of whether the capital adequacy weighting differential is too
large in favour of short-term loans for non-OECD countries, resulting in excessive incentives for short-term
lending. A narrowing of this differential may be desirable. A further distinction in the capital adequacy rules of
the Basle Committee that may require some revision is that between OECD and non-OECD countries. A more
appropriate distinction could be according to the quality of banking supervision, with lower risk weighting being
given to countries with better banking supervision.
As regards portfolio flows to emerging markets, there is an important regulatory gap, as at present there is
no international regulatory framework for taking account of market or credit risks on flows originating in
institutional investors, such as mutual funds (and more broadly for flows originating in non-bank institutions)
(Griffith-Jones 1998b). This important regulatory gap needs to be filled, to protect both retail investors in
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developed countries and developing countries from the negative effects of excessively large and potentially
volatile portfolio flows. An innovative aspect of this type of regulation is that it would protect recipient
countries more than investors.
The East Asian crisis confirms what was already clearly visible in the Mexican peso crisis. Institutional
investors, for example mutual funds, given the very liquid nature of their investments can play an important role
in contributing to currency crises. It seems important, therefore, to introduce some regulation to discourage
excessive surges of portfolio flows. This could perhaps best be achieved by a variable risk-weighted cash
requirement for institutional investors, such as mutual funds. Introducing a dynamic risk-weighted cash
requirement for mutual funds (and perhaps other institutional investors) is in the mainstream of current
regulatory thinking and would require either that standards be provided by relevant regulatory authorities or that
they be agreed internationally. The guidelines for macroeconomic risk, which would determine the cash
requirement, would take into account such vulnerability variables as the ratio of a country's current account
deficit (or surplus) to GDP, the level of its short-term external liabilities to foreign exchange reserves, the
fragility of the banking system, as well as other relevant country risk factors. It is important that quite
sophisticated analysis is used, to avoid simplistic criteria stigmatising countries unnecessarily. The views of the
national central bank and the treasury in the source countries and of the IMF and the BIS should be helpful in
this respect. The securities regulators in source countries would be the most appropriate institutions to
implement such regulations, which could be coordinated internationally by the International Organisation of
Securities' Commissions (IOSCO).
The fact that the level of the required cash reserves capital charge would vary with the level of countries'
perceived macroeconomic risk would make it relatively more profitable to invest in countries with good
fundamentals and relatively less profitable to invest in countries with more problematic macroeconomic or
financial sector fundamentals. If these fundamentals in a country should deteriorate, investment would decline
gradually, which it is to be hoped would force an early correction of policy, and, a resumption of flows.
Though the requirement for cash reserves on mutual funds' assets invested in emerging markets could increase
somewhat the cost of raising foreign capital for them, this would be compensated by the benefit of a more stable
supply of funds, at a more stable cost.
This proposal needs to be examined further. In particular, it is critically important that any regulatory
provisions of this kind should ensue from guidelines formulated through international consultations such as
those employed in developing the 'Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision'. The guidelines could be
developed by a working group consisting of representatives of the national regulatory authorities in source
countries together with those from emerging market countries. Due account should be taken of relevant existing
regulations, such as the European Commission's Capital Adequacy Directive.
Finally, it is important to stress that additional regulation of mutual funds should be symmetrical with
regulation of other institutions (e.g. banks) and other potentially volatile flows.
Further study is required to detect and cover any other existing monitoring or regulatory gaps, e.g. as relates
to instruments such as derivatives and institutions such as hedge funds. The possible need to supervise rating
agencies may also require further investigation, as do the norms that could be set to supervise them adequately.
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The possible need for regulation of rating agencies arises from the mistakes made by these institutions before,
during and after the East Asian crisis.
More generally, further work is required to gain a better understanding of recent changes in global credit
and capital markets, and – more specifically – of the criteria used by different categories of market actors –
including small and large banks, mutual funds, hedge funds and others – to go in and out of countries as well as
the incentives that encourage particular patterns of market actors' behaviour which contribute to speculative
pressures on individual countries and to contagion to other countries. A better understanding of behavioural
patterns and of trends in outflows could help in the design of measures – to be taken by individual firms, by
parts of the financial industry via self-regulation, by regulators and/or by governments (e.g. via tax measures) –
to discourage market imperfections, like disaster myopia and herding, that contribute to currency crises.
A further measure that may deserve more investigation is a cross-border uniform tax on spot transactions
in foreign exchange. This could complement measures for improving and completing international prudential
supervision for credit and capital markets as described above. The aim of such a proposal is broadly to slow
down speculative, short-term capital flows (which would be more affected as by definition they cross borders
often, and would be taxed every time), while having only a marginal effect on long-term flows. More generally, a
multilateral tax agreement (with effective multilateral taxation of corporate profits or perhaps of dividends)
could be a desirable step in this context. Such an agreement – if appropriately structured – could not only
improve the fiscal revenue position of developing countries and reduce the use of tax incentives to foreign
investors, thus increasing resources for social infrastructure, but also contribute to stabilisation of financial
flows.
It can be concluded that a package of measures needs to be taken to make currency crises in emerging
markets far less likely, and therefore ensure the efficient operation of the market economy in emerging markets,
which should be a basis for sustained development. The objective of crises avoidance seems to require some
discouragement and regulation of excessive and potentially unsustainable short-term inflows. Such measures
would be most effective if they are applied both by source and recipient countries (though the main
responsibility lies with recipient countries), if these measures avoid discouraging more long-term flows (which
on the contrary need to be encouraged) if the rules designed are simple and clearly targeted at unsustainable
flows and, particularly, if they are complemented by good policies in the emerging economies.
4.2   Crisis Management
Though prevention is far better than cure, if prevention fails and major currency crises do unfortunately occur,
measures need to be in place to manage them as well as possible. Thus, measures for better crisis management –
both nationally and internationally – are clearly complementary to measures for crisis prevention.
4.2.1   National measures
The policy options at a domestic level once a currency crisis explodes are very limited, and the trade-offs are
very problematic. The standard response required by the markets includes sharp increases in interest rates and
significant fiscal tightening, the latter even in countries with fiscal surpluses.
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There was a great deal of discussion at the conference about appropriate macroeconomic responses to
speculative attacks on currencies, with some disagreements, especially on the correct response of monetary
policy.
Some participants, drawing on the experience of countries like Brazil, Chile and the Czech Republic,
stressed that interest rate increases could be effective in some cases in preventing large currency depreciations,
especially if they were timely, sharp and temporary. However, other participants argued that a positive
correlation between exchange rates and interest rates was uncertain, especially in East Asian countries where
companies have high debt equity ratios. Also, in countries like Malaysia, large corporations that borrow abroad
were hit by depreciation, whilst small companies that borrow domestically were hit by high interest rates. More
generally, the possibility of a 'Laffer-curve type' interest rate – exchange rate link was raised; this would imply
that exchange rates could be defended effectively, using interest rates up to a certain level, but that the
relationship failed to hold beyond a certain point. There was also broad agreement that sustained high real
interest rates had important negative effects, both on the financial system and on the real economy. As a
consequence, it seemed desirable that East Asian economies should continue prudently to lower interest rates.
However, further research is required on interest rate policies in open economies, that are consistent with
currency stability, strong financial systems and – above all – sustained growth.
4.2.2   International measures
Sufficient l iquidity and appropriate conditionality
The first response internationally when a large currency crisis starts unfolding in one or more countries is to
activate quickly a sufficiently large financing package to provide the important public good of stability. The key
institution in this has been the International Monetary Fund, through its own resources and its catalytic role in
attracting other resources, both public and private. The key problem is that the resources that official sources –
and particularly the IMF – can command are relatively small, in proportion to the scale of private sector flows.
This was more clear in the case of the Asian crisis, whereas in the Mexican peso crisis the official financing
package was proportionally larger and more effective than in East Asia.
According to some participants at the conference, the limited funds of the IMF imply that a very high
proportion of its loans goes indirectly to the creditors; furthermore, because creditors are aware that official
funds are limited, they are insufficient to restore confidence, and may provide an additional incentive to leave
the country quickly. For these reasons, though official financing is very large, little of it stays in the domestic
economy to help sustain economic activity and recovery. A further related problem is that short-term lenders
and holders of very liquid assets tend to be protected, whilst long-term lenders may suffer losses; this provides
the wrong signal, as it further encourages short-term lending and discourages long-term lending for the future.
The effects of official financing packages therefore benefit creditors more than developing countries; within the
group of creditors, they are more beneficial for short-term lenders. In both aspects, the outcome is the opposite
of what would be desirable from a developmental perspective.
To overcome these serious problems in current arrangements, three avenues can be pursued. The first one
is to enhance resources for official and other financing (see below). The second avenue is for the IMF to play a
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far greater role in determining burden-sharing between developing countries and their creditors, by encouraging
debt reschedulings where the problem is one of liquidity, and debt reduction where necessary. This makes it very
important to develop orderly workout procedures, which will reduce the required scale of international lending
(see below). Several participants at the conference argued that specifically in the case of some East Asian
countries debt reduction may be needed, to avoid a 'lost decade to development', as occurred in Latin America
in the 1980s. Furthermore, as was shown in the case of Latin America, a reduction in the debt overhang can help
restore confidence to private investors, both foreign and domestic. However, debt reduction in the Asian case
needs to be adapted to the fact that the problems are of excessive private debt and of private insolvency.
Mechanisms such as debt equity swaps may be useful as a way forward. The third avenue to be pursued is to
reduce the likelihood of currency crises, with preventive measures along the lines discussed above, which will
limit moral hazard (see next section) and discourage surges of short-term capital inflows.
Given the large scale of the resources required – and the limitation of IMF resources – complementary
avenues for sufficient provision of early liquidity need to be explored. One possible modality is via enhanced
central bank cooperative arrangements, through greatly enlarged swap arrangements, both within regions as well
as particularly between G-10 members and non-members. Another possible avenue is via pre-committed stand-
by arrangements with private banks, as Argentina and Mexico have recently made; however, these latter
arrangements are still untested, and it is unclear how well they would operate in a severe crisis. The problem is a
crucial one as in order to be effective for restoring confidence, the liquidity provided needs to be large. It is
important that in facing currency crises, an appropriate combination of adjustment, financing and, if necessary,
debt workouts be adopted. Also, an appropriate combination of resources needs to be made available to enable
the IMF to work towards stabilisation and to put the World Bank in a position that allows it to deal with the
social effects of crises.
A number of issues arise relating to the IMF's role in providing liquidity. Besides the crucial issue of the
scale of resources, which has just been discussed, other issues include: timing, conditionality and ways to avoid
moral hazard.
The issue of timing is important as currency crises happen so quickly. Though the IMF and the
international financial community have made important efforts to develop emergency procedures to speed up
significantly the response to currency crises, it is still not fast enough. A currency crisis is able to unfold for a
couple of weeks before a financing package can be put in place. As markets move so fast and overreact, a great
deal of damage can occur in that period. Due to contagion, the crisis can spread rapidly to other countries. A
solution worth considering is to have increasing recourse to IMF-supported preventive programmes; a country
could make a request for the right to borrow from the IMF before a crisis happens. The country would only
draw on this facility if a crisis occurred, but could then do so immediately.
An additional serious problem, particularly relevant for low-income countries, is that when such large
volumes of IMF – as well as World Bank and Regional Development Bank – funding are channelled towards
middle-income countries in a crisis, funding available from those institutions for low-income countries can fall
drastically.
A final issue is the nature of the IMF conditionality that should accompany the large financial packages
linked to currency crises. It is crucial that IMF conditionality contributes to rebuild, and not undermine, markets'
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confidence in countries. As a consequence, it is counterproductive for the IMF to be critical of many structural
features of crisis economies, as this further undermines markets' confidence. As far as possible, IMF
conditionality should focus on macroeconomic policies, and not be too intrusive or too comprehensive. Only
where more structural reforms are essential for confidence building, and can be effectively implemented in the
short run, should they be included as part of short-term policy conditionality. Other structural reforms could be
undertaken later, once stabilisation has been achieved and growth has been restored. Indeed, it is essential that
the time within which structural reforms are required is realistic.
Orderly debt workouts
As pointed out above, the Asian crisis has lent a sense of urgency to the search for ways of managing financial
crises more effectively. The scale of capital flows in the 1990s means that public funds can no longer be relied
upon to offset the private outflows during a crisis. In response to this situation, there is a growing consensus
that better means of burden sharing are required, with the private sector taking some of the responsibility for the
ongoing provision of credit to borrowers in crisis countries.
This consensus is also a response to the increased concern over moral hazard issues, a consequence of the
scale of the IMF-led rescue packages in Asia, together with the one put together for Mexico during the peso
crisis. Moral hazard occurs when the party that assesses the level of risk of a given transaction receives the gains
from, but does not bear the full costs of, the risks taken. The knowledge that IMF-led lending would be likely
should a country hit difficulties may discourage investors and lenders from adequately assessing risks.
However, the problems involved in collective action, and the risk of contagion are a clear justification for
official intervention in crises. The problems of collective action were clearly illustrated during the 1980s debt
crisis, when the long-, drawn-out debt negotiations were an important factor in delaying recovery in Latin
America. A further example is that of Indonesia in the current crisis, where it took six months for the country to
reach agreement with foreign banks on a private-sector debt restructuring programme. During the intervening
period, January to June 1998, the Indonesian economy deteriorated to the point where debt rescheduling may no
longer be sufficient, that is, the liquidity crisis may have turned into a solvency crisis.
There is clearly a need for a system that can bring about a more rapid solution of crises, while limiting the
problems of moral hazard. There is now a growing consensus that ways need to be found to encourage a greater
assumption of risk by the private sector, as well as to involve the private sector at an early stage in crisis
resolution in order to achieve equitable burden-sharing vis-à-vis the official sector. In a short-term liquidity
crisis, which is what many now believe the Asian crisis was, at least at the outset, the timely provision of
significant further credit could avoid the imposition of damaging austerity measures on affected economies. In
such cases, the official sector, rather than bailing out private creditors, could bail them in by enforcing early debt
negotiations. The private creditors could be encouraged to retain their exposure, and to restructure their short-
term credits over a longer term, as a condition of official assistance. In cases of insolvency, the official sector
could play a vital role in coordinating the debt workout, including compelling private creditors to write off debt
where necessary. As pointed out above, debt reduction and/or debt equity swaps may become necessary in
some Asian countries.
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Mechanisms need to be established for orderly debt workouts in future crises. These would include: (i)
changes in the provisions of loan contracts and bond covenants to facilitate restructuring; (ii) the use of a
unilateral stay on payments; and (iii) the potential for lending into arrears by the IMF.
The search for more effective ways to manage financial crises remains a priority as crises will never be
eliminated altogether. The orderly debt workout proposals being discussed offer important ways to improve the
existing mechanisms for dealing with crises, while minimising moral hazard and therefore reducing the
likelihood of crises occurring in the first place. It is unfortunate that though these orderly workout initiatives had
been endorsed by the G-10 report produced after the Mexican peso crisis, nothing had come of them by the
time the Asian crisis began in the summer of 1997.
The current standard crisis response, which concentrates on imposing tough stabilisation measures on
debtors, has had a particularly debilitating effect on the Asian countries affected by the present crisis. The
lengthy negotiations to agree debt restructuring in Indonesia, and the disarray when foreign banks were asked to
roll over loans to South Korea are potent examples of the failings of the present arrangements. Valuable time
was wasted, and crises which may well have been short-term liquidity crises at the outset became full-blown
economic and financial crises, with serious social and political consequences for the country as well as
consequences for the global economy. It is imperative that significant improvements are made to the
mechanisms for managing crises before the next crisis occurs. The official sector should now press for the
implementation of contract clauses in bonds and other credit instruments to facilitate restructuring, and the IMF
should extend its policy for lending into arrears, which now only applies in some cases to arrears to commercial
banks.
A new financial  architecture
In our discussions at the conference, both on international measures for currency crisis prevention and
management, the focus was on how existing institutional arrangements might be improved, and existing gaps
might be filled. However, almost inevitably the discussion was broadened to the deeper issue of what desirable
institutional structures would look like if they are to meet development needs in the context of new and more
globalised private capital and credit markets.
In particular, three functions of global financial market management need to be appropriately met:
1. The provision of appropriate surveillance and prudential regulation of financial intermediaries, both in
developing and developed countries. Though part of this task is carried out by the Basle Committee and
other coordinating mechanisms, important gaps particularly in international, but also in national, prudential
regulation remain. An interesting question is how these new needs should be met, whether by development
of, or improved coordination between, existing institutions or by creation of some new institutional
mechanisms.
2. The provision of international official liquidity to the market, including last-resort lending in distress
conditions. Currently, this function falls implicitly on the IMF – although it has, at present, insufficient
funds and can only lend to governments, and only does so to emerging economies' governments. Though
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performing valuable functions, the IMF does not act as a classical lender of the last resort, as it does not
have unlimited liquidity and does not lend to international banks. Through what mechanisms/institutions
should the provision of official liquidity be enhanced?  Should it continue to be provided to emerging
economy governments, so as to indirectly help finance international creditors?
3. As discussed above, there are limited methods for orderly debt workouts, and therefore the weight is on
developing country adjustment and, occasionally and often too late, on relatively ad hoc debt reschedulings
and reductions. How should such international debt workout arrangements best be developed?  What
should the institutional mechanisms for its operation be?
Major changes in institutional structures may be difficult and time-consuming to achieve. However, it seems
highly desirable to develop a clear vision of an appropriate international framework that would allow an orderly
global financial market to continue to support the development process and would help avoiding
developmentally and financially costly crises like the Asian one. Such a vision could then guide more gradual
steps towards a more appropriate global framework.
5   RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FROM THE IDS EAST ASIA CONFERENCE
Six major research topics clearly emerged at the conference, as being highly relevant for policy design and as
having very important implications for long-term development prospects.
5.1   On the Supply Side of Capital Flows
If there is a great development promise in increased access to international capital flows, recent experience also
cautions us about the risks involved, including major and costly currency crises. The Mexican peso crisis was the
first of these major currency crises. The recent currency crises in East Asia, their magnitude and their deeply
negative impact on development and poverty again show the importance of the new policy challenges involved.
What is remarkable, given the new magnitude of capital flows moving into and out of developing countries, the
importance accorded to these in national policies, and the large impact of capital flows on these economies'
development prospects, is how little the complex factors that are influencing the supply of these flows have
been studied and how little they are understood. It is difficult to imagine an area where new and appropriate
knowledge is more urgently required and of greater immediate policy relevance. The recent IDS-DFID
Conference on the East Asian crisis highlighted the urgency of this research.
The proposed research is directed towards helping to fill that gap. It would have to address three more
specific objectives:
1. Improve significantly empirical knowledge of how and with what criteria different institutional investors
(pension funds, mutual funds and hedge funds), and their fund managers allocate their assets globally and to
developing countries. This empirical work is very important, as existing knowledge on institutional investors'
criteria, and their impact on the supply and stability of capital flows to developing countries is very limited.
Similar analysis is required with respect to criteria for bank lending.
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2. Analyse the empirical evidence gathered, to try to determine if a 'ranking of volatility' can be established for
different types of institutions (e.g. different types of mutual funds, between mutual funds and pension
funds). How does bank lending (of different maturities) fit into a 'ranking of volatility'?  What role do
domestic actors play in sparking off currency crises?
3. Identify the policy implications of the previous analyses, for both developed and developing governments,
as well as for international institutions, on subjects such as regulation, self-regulation, taxation of
institutional investors and incentives for fund managers in developed countries, to encourage more long-
term flows and possibly attempt to moderate short-term flows when these become excessively large.
The target audience for the resulting research output would be practitioners in the private sector and policy-
makers in developed and developing countries, and in international organisations, as well as academics and
journalists. Representatives of these groups would be directly involved by writing some of the papers, acting as
commentators, and being invited to dissemination presentations.
It may be a useful approach to adopt a methodology that combines reviews of the academic and other
literature, gathering of empirical material available from both private and public sources, and extensive
interviews of institutional investors and bankers. This type of research would have to be collaborative, involving
well-known experts. A study group, involving private sector actors and regulators, would guide the research
carried out.
5.2   Developmental Impact of External Capital Flows
Standard economic theory assumes that international capital flows contribute to growth and development
through a number of mechanisms. However, the standard view has been increasingly challenged theoretically.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that certain categories of flow (especially short-term, easily reversible
flows) have serious development costs, as dramatically exemplified by the East Asian Crisis. As Joseph Stiglitz
(1998), the Chief Economist of the World Bank, has concluded recently:
although there is by and large a consensus amongst economists – based on a wealth of studies – that trade
liberalisation brings significant economic gains, there is no such consensus about capital account
liberalisation. There is savage debate and even outright hostility on this point. What is required here is
patient, systematic and credible scholarship, the outcome of which will bear directly on the future of any
development model and approaches to poverty alleviation.
Research in this area should aim to contribute to the development of a more consensual view by undertaking
further study of the net growth and development effects of different categories of capital inflows and outflows
(foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, bank loans of different maturities, etc.) for different types of
developing countries. The conclusions of this research would have important policy implications for when and
how different categories of developing countries should liberalise their capital account, and what regulatory and
other measures should accompany such liberalisation.
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It is important that this research (a) is systematic and (b) assesses capital flows and capital account liberalisation
from the perspective of their impact on development and particularly on poverty alleviation, and not – as is
conventionally done – purely by their impact on financial markets.
5.3   Management of Capital Flows by Developing Countries
Research on this topic should examine two categories of issues:
1. The first is macroeconomic management, especially of exchange rates and interest rates, for open
developing countries. Again the growth and development impact of different options would be given
highest priority in the analysis.
As regards exchange rates, research is required into arrangements that are sufficiently flexible to cope
with large capital flows and their changes, but that do not discourage investment and employment. As both
overvalued and volatile exchange rates discourage investment, especially in tradables, this is an important
issue. A second key variable is interest rate policy. Managing capital flows often requires very high levels of
interest rates, especially when there is pressure on the currency; this tightening of monetary policy has
negative effects on private investment and employment. On the other hand, if interest rates are not raised,
there is a risk of a large currency crisis, which is also very negative for growth and development.
This analysis is in the context where in open economies, economic authorities currently have the
classical Tinbergen dilemma, of having too few instruments to achieve all their objectives.
2. Any research undertaken with respect to this issue should also establish a taxonomy of prudential measures
to discourage excessive inflows of potentially volatile short-term capital. This taxonomy should include
instruments that already exist in a variety of developing countries (e.g. Chilean-style non-remunerated
reserve requirements as one of many possibilities) and that have been implemented in developed economies.
A rigorous assessment of the impact of these instruments would be carried out, as well as an assessment of
how they could best be implemented. This could be helpful in contributing to develop 'best practice' criteria
for developing countries on prudential measures.
5.4   Overproduction
The East Asian crisis has two particular characteristics that suggest its importance as a springboard for future
research. First, by (researchable) hypothesis it is less a crisis of East Asia but more a global crisis in East Asia.
And, second, there are underlying trajectories in the real economy that have interacted with global financial
flows, boiling over into the financial turmoil that has beset the region over the past twelve months. Contrary to
much conventional wisdom, the contribution of the real economy to the financial crisis is to be found in the use
to which national and foreign savings have been put in promoting growth through exceptionally high savings
and investment ratios. These investments have been concentrated in sectors and in particular niches of sectors,
promoting intense competition. This, in turn, has been reflected in sharply declining terms of trade and has
contributed to a round of competitive devaluations, which has worsened this particular crisis. However, the
nature and extent of this concentrated 'overinvestment' is poorly understood. So, too, are the links between
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these concentrated patterns of investment, financial flows, corporate organisation (for example high gearing
ratios) and domestic financial intermediation. A greater understanding of the specific and generalisable nature of
these complex two-way interactions between the real and financial economies will be helpful in developing an
appropriate policy response and thereby avoiding similar crises both in East Asia and in other regions of the
global economy.
5.5   Global Financial Market Management
Research under this heading should examine the need for development-enhancing management of global
financial markets. In that context, it would make suggestions for changes to be made by financial markets
themselves (via self-regulation or other mechanisms), by governments, by regulators, by international financial
institutions and by better coordination between the different actors. If and where necessary, due to the existence
of clear gaps, suggestions should be made for institutional developments.
Research should focus on three questions: how can more long-term capital be attracted to developing
countries, especially the poorest ones? How can costly currency and financial crises be prevented? And how can
currency crises be better managed, if they do occur? Three functions of the global financial architecture would
be emphasised:
1. provision of appropriate information on, surveillance and prudential regulation of financial markets, in
developing and developed countries as well as on a global level. This should cover all financial markets,
where the benefits of such prudential regulation outweigh the costs.
2. provision of appropriate and sufficient international liquidity, in times of distress and
3. the creation of adequate mechanisms to share the burdens between debtors and creditors, including orderly
workout procedures.
5.6   The Design of Affordable Social Protection Nets
Currency and financial crises can abruptly increase poverty and disrupt existing protection mechanisms for the
poor, even in countries where poverty had been rapidly falling, if social protection nets were not properly
developed. The design of affordable social protection nets is both essential and difficult for countries
undergoing financial and currency crises, and research is needed on the most efficient and most cost-effective
mechanisms, from a poverty alleviation perspective, that can be developed for offering social protection;
research is also required on how such social protection can best be funded, e.g. by increased taxes or cutbacks in
non-essential government spending. The design of affordable social protection nets must be developed in forms
that are consistent with, and encourage, economic recovery.
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NOTES
1. Data on growth in 1997 and previous years as well as data on growth projections for 1998 for the
Philippines are taken from Park and Song 1998. 1998 growth forecasts for South Korea and Thailand were
reported in the Financial Times of 29 July 1998 (p 3). 1998 growth estimates for Malaysia are from the
Financial Times of 27 July 1998 (p 2), and the 1998 forecast for Singapore is reported in a Reuters
newswire (Reuters 1998a). Indonesia's GDP growth projection for the fiscal year 1998/99 is given in
Reuters 1998b.
2. Reuters 1998c. This view on likely increases in poverty is shared by Mari Pangestu of Jakarta's Center for
Strategic and International Studies, as quoted in Marshall 1998.
3. For details on interest rate rises during 1997, see IMF 1997. More recent data are only available for a small
number of countries. Interest rate data in the IMF's International Financial Statistics for May 1998 indicate
that money market rates increased from 11.2 per cent in June 1997 to 23.5 per cent in February 1998 in
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